Abstract -An increasing number of constitutions contain "unamendable provisions" in order, inter alia, to 
of unamendable provisions within a constitution has become an important element of modern constitutional design and of global constitutionalism, and since in recent decades unamendable provisions have expanded in terms of their detail, currently covering a wide range of topics. This growing phenomenon demands careful attention.
The article is developed in the following way: the first section examines unamendable provisions. In order to do so, it reviews in Section 2 the origins of unamendable provisions and supplies a general overview of this global constitutional phenomenon. It is argued that unamendability has become a prominent feature of modern constitutional design. Section 3 then describes the structure and content of unamendable provisions, seeking any content-based or material links among them. Finally, Section 4 analyses the characteristics of unamendable provisions. It argues that unamendable provisions have different characteristics of preservation, transformation, aspiration, conflict and bricolage, all carrying both expressive and functional importance for creating and maintaining constitutional identity. Unamendable provisions are a complex and controversial constitutional mechanism 12 . However, it is not the aim of this article to argue whether unamendable provisions are necessarily good or bad, or to engage with their effectiveness or enforceability, important as these issues are, but rather to study explicit limitations on the amendment power as a growing phenomenon of global constitutionalism 13 .
Unamendable Provisions
John Locke, who in 1669 wrote "The Fundamental Constitution" of the colony of Carolina, provided that it "shall be and remain the sacred and unalterable form and rule of government of Carolina forever" 14 . Treating the entire constitution as unamendable derives either from ascribing it to a superhuman source, or from the constitution-maker being afflicted with exceptional arrogance and belief that he has achieved the apex of perfection 15 . Nowadays, such "delusions of unamendable grandeur" no Review/Response, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation, (February 25, 2014) reflect the idea that certain constitutional subjects ought to be protected from alteration. Different motives for the creation of unamendable provisions can be suggested. First, each polity wants to preserve its own existence and identity. Presumably, constitution-makers regarded the content of specific provisions to be so pivotal to the essence of the constitution or to the state's existence and identity that they should endure for generations 21 . Unamendable provisions are meant to provide "hermetic protection" and block even the constitutional amendment process, thereby preventing violations of certain basic constitutive principles via the majoritarian procedure. Thus they reflect the idea that a nation's identity and constitutive narrative should not be subjugated to the majority's 16 SANFORD LEVINSON, Designing an Amendment Process, in: JOHN FEREJOHN/JACK N. RAKOVE/JONATHAN RILEY (eds), Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule, CUP, 272 (2001) . Nowadays, amendment procedures are a universally recognised constitutional method. See DONALD S. LUTZ, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88(2) Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 355, 356 (1994) ("The innovation of an amendment process … has diffused throughout the world to the point where less than 4% of all national constitutions lack a provision for a formal amending process") (referring to HENC VAN MAARSEVEEN/GER VAN DER TANG, Written Constitutions: Computerized Comparative Study, Brill, 80 (1978) 71, 109 (1999) . 18 By its nature, the primary constituent power which is the power to constitute a new constitutional order is unlimited be prior constitutional rules. See YANIV ROZNAI, The Theory and Practice of 'Supra-Constitutional' Limits on Constitutional Amendments, 62 I.C.L.Q. 557 (2013) It is told that after implementing extensive reforms, Lycurgus, Sparta's great lawgiver, administered an oath that his laws would be observed without alterations until his return from a journey to the oracle. After the oracle reassured him that his laws were good for the people, he sent her words to Sparta and sacrificed his life to perpetuate his laws, which indeed lasted for 500 years 27 . The contemporary relevance of this ancient story is not only due to the idea of 'immutable' laws, but also because of the lawmaker's motives. Just as Lycurgus wanted his laws to last forever since he believed they were good for his people, so too modern unamendable provisions largely reflect a kind of paternalistic idea according to which constitution-makers know "what is best" for the people and "enshrine" those well-esteemed principles or institutions. Rev. 449 (2011) . For example, the unamendability of fundamental rights reflects the idea that "unlike ordinary legislation which is governed by the majoritarian principle, human rights alone are not subject to the will of the majority". See GUNNAR BECK, The Idea of human Rights Between
Value Pluralism and Conceptual Vagueness, 25 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 615 (2006 
Examining Unamendable Provisions

A. Structure
Unamendable provisions limit the holder of the constitutional amendment power. They prohibit the amendment power from exercising its power with regard to certain constitutional subjects. They create a space in which that power is not permitted to enter. Different techniques for protecting constitutional subjects from amendments exist. The majority of constitutions explicitly protect certain constitutional subjects (principles or institutions). Some constitutions refer specifically to certain constitutional provisions, prohibiting any amendments to them 50 . Others combine these two approaches to unamendability 51 . Albeit rarely, some constitutions do not protect specific constitutional subjects from amendments, but rather a more general "spirit of the constitution" 52 , "spirit of the preamble" 53 ,
"fundamental structure of the constitution" 54 , or "the nature and constituent elements of the state" 55 .
The formulation of unamendability as rules that demand strict compliance or as principles that are more generalized guidelines might carry decisive importance for their enforcement and application.
Unamendability which is designed as a legal directive demands a strict compliance and requires a yesor-no decision on its breach. It thus imposes a stricter margin of interpretation to the courts, but at the same time grants added legitimacy for their judicial enforcement. In contrast, unamendability which is designed as principles is a far more flexible approach since the elasticity and semantic openness of principles allow their content to evolve with time and allow courts a greater margin of discretion and interpretive recreation.
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Most unamendable provisions are located within the amendment provision, but unamendability can also appear as an independent provision 57 or inferred from a provision declaring Constitution, according to which "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate", seems to be a de facto unamendable provision, as it is hard to imagine a state giving its consent for such an act.
The act that is prohibited by unamendable provisions varies among different constitutions.
While most constitutions simply prohibit "amending" or "revising" certain constitutional subjects, some state that amendments must "respect" or "safeguard" certain constitutional subjects 60 . Often, the prohibited act is not "amending" certain subjects, but rather the mere "proposal" of amendments 61 .
Whereas the ultimate result of these two limitations seems similar, presumably the latter limitation positions the barrier to the prohibited change at an earlier phase than the actual act of amendment, i.e.
at the beginning of the political process, so that the proposed change cannot even be debated.
Finally, most of the world's unamendable provisions are non-self-entrenched provisions, i.e.
they establish the unamendability of certain constitutional subjects but they are themselves not entrenched 62 . In order to avoid the legal option of overcoming unamendability through a "doubleamendment process" 63 , some unamendable provisions are self-entrenched, i.e. by their express terms they not only prohibit amendments of certain subjects, but also prohibit amendments to themselves 64 -a "double entrenchment mechanism" 65 .
B. Content
The content of unamendable provisions varies, but despite some minor exceptions, one can identify several common components 66 . The first notable protected group is the form and system of government.
government is also protected 67 , as well as "amiri" 68 , "a crowned democracy" 69 , "constitutional monarchy", and "a democratic regime of government with king as head of the State" 70 . , but also to serve as a pre-commitment mechanism of the "people" to protect itself against its own weaknesses and passions 125 . We limit ourselves so that in times when we might lose control of our reasonable judgment we will not be able to amend the constitution in a way that we will later regret 126 . Ulysses and the Sirens is often the metaphor used to illustrate this idea: "[w]hen Ulysses bound himself to the mast and had his rowers put wax in their ears, it was to make it impossible for him to succumb to the song of the sirens" 127 . Making certain subjects immune to amendment, Jon Elster notes, is "a perfect protection against impulsive rashness" 128 .
However, Elster reminds us, unamendable provisions "do not bind in a strict sense, because extraconstitutional action always remains possible"
129
. Indeed, as Silvia Suteu at I have wrote elsewhere, from a factual rather normative perspective, unamendability has a limited ability to block extra-constitutional means.
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Unamendable provisions can not only limit governmental power, but also empower it. When unamendable provisions protect the rights of a monarch, the principle of inherited rules, and succession to the throne, they serve as a mechanism to preserve the existing power of the rulers rather than limit it. "Flexibility for future interests to determine the effects of constitutional provisions is unlikely to be in the interest of those who are presently in the majority but destined to be in the minority in the future. Drafters with such expectations will prefer, rather, to constrain the effects of future actions." but also safeguards Hong Kong's key elements of autonomy 141 .
The more dominant character of unamendable provisions, however, is their ability to transform polities. New constitutions aim to mark a dividing line between the past and the future, representing a new era and an attempt to cultivate a distinct political community. Reacting to past events, constitution-makers mainly have in mind the previous regime's failures, atrocities and abuses 142 . Constitutions "reflect fear, originating in, and related to, the previous political regime", and their guarantees reflect "the institutional negation of the oppression recently endured" 143 . Emerging out of previous and dysfunctional regimes, new constitutional unamendable provisions largely react to the faults of past political leaders as an attempt to undo historical injustice. Unamendable provisions therefore have much to teach us about a country's past (and often grave) experiences. The technique of explicitly limiting the amendment power, which migrated among different jurisdictions, at time retained its original expression, whereas on other occasions it absorbed local content, primarily as a response to prior events and past experiences, reflecting the drafters' ambitions to direct the nation away from past tragedies into a more "just" future
144
.
There are many examples of this "negative" role that unamendable provisions play, as a lasting reminder of recent past devastations, and as an attempt to transform -and never return to -"legacies of past injustice" 145 . The post WWII constitutions, Carl Friedrich claimed, were motivated by "a negative distaste for a sordid past" 146 . Elsewhere, Friedrich described the constitutional efforts to block the option of reverting to a grave past:
Since the experience of totalitarian dictatorship proved more terrible, the antagonism aroused by it was correspondingly more fanatic. From this experience there arose a constitutionmaking sentiment, a constituent power, so to speak, which was very strongly determined to bar the recurrence of any such transformation of a free society into voluntary servitude 147 . Indeed, the German Basic Law's unamendability of democracy and human dignity must be understood against the background of the Weimar Constitution, Nazi rule and the Holocaust 148 . Even the German unamendability of federalism can be understood not only as a result of insistence by the allied forces, but also due to the German drafters' realization that one of the Weimar's constitutional failures was the suspension of federalism 149 .
Another example is the new constitutional orders in Central and Eastern Europe upon the collapse of communism, which protect human rights and recognize the practice of judicial review 150 .
Although some have argued that it would be a mistake for these new democracies to import the German "fondness for unamendable provisions", since the vexing questions that they face ought to be resolved in the political sphere rather than in constitutional courts 151 , many of them adopted unamendable provisions 152 . In the post-communist states, unamendability is to be understood in light of a "bitter experience" and as a rejection of the past when constitutions were utilized as political weapons 153 .
Greece could be another example for how the country's past impacted unamendable provisions. Greek Constitutions have traditionally been characterized by a high degree of rigidity 154 .
Whereas the Constitution of 1844 did not include any revision procedure 155 (iii) Aspirational
Unamendable provisions offer a "shorthand record" of the memories and hopes of their framers 165 .
They both "reflect the birth pangs of that particular society", 166 and promise a brighter future 167 . András
Sajó explains that when constitutions affirm an emerging national identity, they aim, inter alia, to make selections that will cause the people to feel good, in contrast with the feelings of fear and outrage about past abuses 168 . Likewise, unamendable provisions imagine a more perfect polity, the kind that the citizenry aspires to become and preserve. If a constitution "reflects the triumphs and disappointments of a nation's past and embodies its hope for the future" . Therefore, the aspirational and transformative aspects of unamendability are strongly connected, the two-sides of a same coin.
(iv) Conflictual Unamendable provisions can be used to manage certain conflicts, for example, by functioning as "gag rules" for silencing contentious issues 175 . Even in democratic societies -where the desire is to publicly debate disputes and to use political mechanisms for decision-making -there might be strong rationales not to openly debate certain disputes. A dispute might be so severe that a public debate would not bring . The silencing tactic thus has the practical disadvantage of intensifying the tension with regard to delicate issues, a process that might end in an uncontrolled revolutionary explosion, which the gag rule was originally intended to prevent 188 .
Therefore, it might be argued that it is perhaps better to use a "sunset provision", a temporal unamendability, which allows the removal of the contentious issue from the public agenda for a while without long-term restraints 189 . Of course, the risk of using revolutionary forcible means to override unamendability is not unique to gag rules, but it is certainly exacerbated in these cases Additionally, during the 1988 constitution-making process, three major Portuguese constitutionalists visited the country, bringing the experience of the Portuguese constitutional process 217 . Indeed, influenced by Portugal, the current Brazilian Constitution includes a broad unamendable provision.
These events demonstrate the borrowing of explicit limits on amendment powers.
Finally, a quick look at the collection of world unamendable provisions reveals that many of the unamendable provisions simply repeat themselves (often with slight changes) in a nation's subsequent constitutions. This again demonstrates the "bricolage" idea of using unamendable provisions that "are at hand". An obvious example is the Dominican Republic in which the exact same unamendable provision repeats itself in thirteen constitutions from 1907 to 2002, and a similar (but not identical) provision repeats itself in ten constitutions from 1865 to 1896. Such repetition seems more like an expression of historical or cultural convention than necessarily reflecting the result of a constructive, rational constitution-making process. Therefore, one should be cautious in always imputing unamendable provisions a high degree of productive prudence 218 .
Conclusion
Unamendability is undeniably a "complex and potentially controversial constitutional instrument, which should be applied with care, and reserved only for the basic principles of the democratic 67, 71 (1899-1900 ) (stating the a constitution's form of government "has in many cases been determined not by any rational conviction that a particular kind of government was adapted to meet the wants of a given people, but by the inconscious desire of constitution makers to follow the reigning fashion of their day…") 219 European Commission for Democracy through Law, Report on Constitutional Amendment, para. 218 (Venice, 11-12 December 2009) . Importantly, constitutional identity is never a static thing but emerges from the interplay of inevitably disharmonic elements 227 . It can always be reinterpreted and reconstructed 228 .
One method through which a constitutional identity can evolve with time is the constitutional amendment process 229 . Indeed, the amendment process is not merely a technical mechanism of balancing constitutional stability and flexibility, but it directly implicates the nature of the constitutional system 230 . A constitutional identity is changeable, but is "resistant to its own destruction" 231 . Aiming at preventing certain changes, unamendable provisions can be regarded as efforts for maintaining a state's constitutional identity 232
